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HUMAN RIGHTS AS RHETORIC: The Persian Gulf War and
United States Policy Toward Iraq
President George Bush cited Iraqi human rights abuses as partial
justification for the 1991 war between United States-led coalition
forces and Iraq in the Persian Gulf ("the Gulf War") in order to build
a domestic and international consensus against Iraq. Throughout the
1980s, the U.S. State Department consistently acknowledged Iraq's
human rights violations,I yet violations did not significantly influence
United States foreign policy toward Iraq prior to the Gulf War.
Geopolitical and economic concerns, such as developing Iraq as a
market for American exports2 and securing Iraq as a potentially con-
sistent source of oil 3 motivated the United States to maintain an uneasy
alliance with Iraq and support Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. 4 The
only Reagan Administration criticism of Iraqi human rights violations
that influenced its foreign policy derived from another concern-
controlling proliferation of chemical weapons.5 Congress was more
critical of Iraqi human rights abuses than the Administration but
generally bowed to the Administration's pressure to support Iraq.
6
This past United States indifference toward Iraq's human rights vio-
lations renders suspect the Bush Administration's claim that such
abuses genuinely motivated military action.
The United States provided both direct and indirect political and
economic assistance to Iraq throughout the 1980s. The Reagan Ad-
ministration supported Iraq diplomatically during the Iran-Iraq War,
1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1989, at 1411 (1990); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1988, at 1355 (1989); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, at 1166 (1988). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1991, at A6, col.
3.
2. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
3. In the late 1980s the U.S. bought approximately eight percent (675,000 barrels per day)
of its oil from Iraq. Dumas, Hill Members Renew Attempts to Impose Trade Sandions, 48 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1281, 1282 (1990). Earlier in the decade, the U.S. was especially concerned
that the Iran-Iraq War might threaten oil exports and drive up oil prices. See N.Y. Times, Jan.
15, 1987, at D24, col. 5.
4. See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. The Iran-Iraq War lasted approximately from
September 1980 to August 1988. D. HIRO, THE LONGEST WAR (1989). This period roughly
coincided with the tenure of the Reagan Administration. Saddam Hussein ruled at the time,
having assumed power in 1979. Id. For information on Saddam Hussein's rise to power, his
alleged human rights abuses, and the political climate in Iraq, see generally J. MILLER & L.
MYIRoIE, SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE CRISIS IN THE GULF (1990); P. MARE, THE MODERN
HISTORY OF IRAQ (1985); S. KHALIL, REPUBLIC OF FEAR: THE POLITICS OF MODERN IRAQ
(1990); Kom, Blood Baatb: The way Saddam rewards dissent, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 29, 1990,
at 13.
5. See infra note 21.
6. See infra notes 16, 18, 27-29, 32-38 and accompanying text.
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even though the United States was officially neutral7 and did not sell
weapons to Iraq.' The State Department praised Iraq for its efforts
toward a peaceful resolution of its dispute with Iran and for its
willingness to comply with United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions. 9 The Reagan Administration also provided the Iraqis with in-
telligence information on Iran during the war. 10 Furthermore, in 1984
the United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq" and
expanded bilateral relations "substantially.' 12
The Reagan Administration provided economic support to Iraq by
requesting that Congress relax applicable export controls 13 and drop
the Export Administration Act requirement, that the State Department
certify whether Iraq supported terrorism. 14 Congress initially opposed
these requests because of its perception that Iraq continued to support
terrorism"5 but finally yielded to pressure in 1985.16 The Reagan
Administration also provided Iraq with $4.5 billion in farm export
credit guarantees between 1983 and 1989.17 Such extensive agricul-
tural aid directly contravened a clear congressional mandate against
providing Iraq with any form of assistance. ' These instances of support
for Iraq indicate that human rights violations and dubious credit-
worthiness were not of great concern to the Administration. 19
7. Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the War Between Iran and Iraq, 1982
PUB. PAPERS 923 (July 14, 1982). See also President's Message to the Congress Concerning the
Continuation of the Iran Emergency, 1982 PUB. PAPERS 1438 (Nov. 8, 1982).
8. See Pipes & Mylroie, Back Iraq: it's timefor a U.S. 'tilt', THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 27,
1987, at 14, 15. The U.S. did, however, license the sale of approximately $60 million worth
of controlled items to Iraq in 1989. Dumas, rupra note 3, at 1282.
9. Doc. No. 263, in U.S. DEPT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1987, at 430
(1988) [hereinafter FOREIGN PoucY 1987] (prepared statement by Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Murphy before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.).
10. See Pipes & Mylroie, supra note 8, at 15.
11. Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1983, at A14, col. 2.
12. FOREIGN POLICY 1987, supra note 9, at 430, 431.
13. Doc. No. 334, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1982, at 784
(1983) (statement by State Department Acting Spokesman Romberg).
14. 1985 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 259 (1986). The Export Administration Act is Pub. L. No.
96-72.
15. See 131 CONG. Rc. H4905 (daily ed. June 25, 1985). The State Department again
placed Iraq on the list of terrorism-supporting countries in September 1990. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: IRAQ'S PARTICIPATION IN U.S. AGRICULTURAL
EXPORT PROGRAMS 14 (1990) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
16. See 1985 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 259 (1986).
17. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. In 1988 Iraq received a full quarter of the Department
of Agriculture's Export Credit Guarantee Programs, making it the second largest recipient of
guarantees and satisfying approximately 25% of its food needs. Through these farm export
credits, the Reagan Administration apparently hoped both to help Iraq in its war against Iran
and to develop Iraq as a lucrative market fbr U.S. agricultural products. Id. at 3-6.
18. See 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 165 (1987). In its 1986 Foreign Aid Act (Pub. L. No.
99-59 1), Congress prohibited indirect U.S. aid to Iraq, "unless the President certified to Congress
that such a ban was contrary to the national interests of the United States." Id.
19. See GAO REPORT, jupra note 15, at 6, 21.
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Although human rights abuses did not significantly influence the
United States' relationship with Iraq during the Reagan years, both
Congress 20 and the Reagan Administration2 1 protested Iraq's use of
chemical weapons on thousands of Iraqi citizens of Kurdish origin
22
in 1988.23 The Reagan Administration delayed confronting Iraq on
the issue,24 however, because it did not want to threaten bilateral
relations with Iraq25 and because it allegedly wanted to verify the
human rights abuses before making the accusation. 26 Congress did
condemn Iraq for its use of chemical weapons in 1988 after the Iran-
Iraq War had ended. Both the Senate27 and House of Representatives
28
voted to impose sanctions, but neither bill became law despite a
congressional consensus on the egregiousness of the violations. 29 The
Reagan Administration opposed both the Senate and House efforts30
and continued to provide financial support to Iraq through the De-
partment of Agriculture's farm export credit guarantee programs? 1
I This disagreement between the executive and legislative branches
continued after President Bush took office in 1988. In 1990 Repre-
sentative Gus Yatron (D-Pa.) introduced a bill to sanction Iraq for its
human rights violations. 32 Despite some support for the bill in Con-
20. Infra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text.
21. Doc. No. 260, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLIcy, 1988, at 458
(1989) (statement by State Department Spokesman Redman). See also President Reagan's speech
to the 43d General Assembly of the United Nations, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1988,
at A10, col. 3; 84 DEP'T ST. BuL.L., June 1984, at 40.
22. The Kurds are an ethnic group which has sought independence from Iraq for decades.
See generally D. McDowALL, THE KuRDs (1989) (Minority Rights Group Rep. 23).
23. See generally Iraq: United States Response to the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons Against the
Kurds, 2 HARV. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 179 (1989). Iraq also used chemical weapons against Iran
during the Iran-Iraq War. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at All, col. 1.
24. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
25. Id.
26. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1988, at 4, col. 4.
27. 1988 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 510 (1989). The bill, sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), condemned Iraq for practicing "genocide" against
the Kurds. See S. 2763, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
28. 1988 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 511 (1989). The House's version was milder than that of the
Senate but would have authorized the President to increase penalties if Iraq did not stop using
chemical weapons. See H.R. 5337, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The bill would have imme-
diately banned the export of milicary-related equipment, computers, and oil-drilling equipment
subject to U.S. export controls. Id.
29. See 1988 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 511 (1989).
30. Id. at 510. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Burleigh stated, "W]e believe that the passage of this legislation now would undercut our
effoits with Iraq and damage U.S. exporters without furthering the goal of ending use by Iraq
of chemical weapons." Doc. No. 262, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1988, ar 459-60 (1989).
31. Press Conf. with Rep. Charles E. Shumer (D-N.Y.), Nov. 20, 1990 (LEGI-SLATE).
32. H. Con. Res. 298, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H1448 (1990). The Yatron
Bill called for more U.S. and international attention to Iraq's human rights violations and
condemned Iraq's forced resettlements of Kurdish and Assyrian communities in northern Iraq.
Id.
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gress, 33 it was opposed by the Bush Administration, 34 and it never
reached the floor of the House for a vote. 35 Other congressional efforts
to impose sanctions on Iraq continued into early 1990,36 including an
effort to sanction Iraq and other countries that used chemical weap-
ons. 37 Throughout early 1990, the Bush Administration resisted
congressional attempts to sanction Iraq, resulting in marked tension
between the two branches.
38
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990,39 prompted a con-
sensus between the Bush Administration and Congress over the im-
portance to United States foreign policy of Iraqi human rights abuses.
The Administration appeared to have shifted its priorities40 in order
to rally public support by appealing to the larger and more abstract
moral concerns of the American people. By repeatedly emphasizing
Iraq's brutality against foreign nationals, 4 1 refugees, 42 and prisoners of
war ("POWs"), 43 by alluding to Iraq's past human rights record,44
and by highlighting information likely to inspire patriotism and fear,4 5
Bush rallied the general public to a war not just for oil or money, but
33. A bipartisan group cosponsored Yatron's bill. House Foreign Affairs Comm. Press Re-
lease, April 2, 1990 (available from House Foreign Affairs Comm.). Other members of Congress
proposed even more stringent bills to sanction Iraq during this period between the Iran-Iraq
War and the Gulf War. See, e.g., S. 2480, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 4585, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 4404, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). None of these bills reached
the floor of the House for a vote. 1990 States News Service, Aug. 22, 1990 (NEXIS).
34. 1990 States News Service, Aug. 22, 1990 (NEXIS). The State Department reversed an
earlier decision to support the bill, arguing that the bill limited executive discretion to impose
sanctions. Iraq Escalates Threat, 34 NEAR EAST REP., Apr. 30, 1990, at 1.
35. 1990 States News Service, Aug. 22, 1990 (NEXIS).
36. See 1989 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 784 (1990).
37. See, e.g., S. 2927, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 3033, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). See also 1989 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 501 (1990).
38. See generally Iraq Escalates Threat, supra note 34, at 1; Dumas, supra note 3, at 1281.
39. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
40. See Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
41. See, e.g., President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, U.S. Military Buildup,
26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1789 (Nov. 8, 1990).
42. See, e.g., President's Proclamation 6219-Refugee Day, 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1701 (Oct. 30, 1990). See also Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1991, § 1, at 5, col. 1. See also Wash. Post, Jan. 27,
1991, at CI, col. 1.
44. 'See, e.g., President's Address Before the 45th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly in New York City, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1496 (Oct. 1, 1990). Bush
pointed to Iraq's disregard for human rights, especially Saddam Hussein's use of poison gas on
the Kurdish people in Iraq, in order to muster support from the U.N. General Assembly. Id.
at 1497. Bush also admitted that Iraq's human rights abuses were not surprising in light of
Saddam Hussein's human rights history. Id.
45. See, e.g., President's News Conference in Orlando, Persian Gulf Crisis, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1719 (Nov. 1, 1990) [hereinafter November 1 News Conference]. In one
of numerous comparisons of Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler, Bush pointed to the similarity
between the Nazi "Death's Head regiments" that invaded Poland and Iraq's troops in Kuwait.
Id. at 1724. See also President's Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters,
26 WEEKLY COMP. PRE&. Doc. 2034 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter December 14 Remarks].
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for humanity. This approach proved to be extremely effective in en-
gendering public revulsion of Saddam Hussein.
46
The United States government, in cooperation with the United
Nations, imposed strict economic sanctions47 and instituted military
action4" against Iraq, justifying these actions in part by pointing to
Iraq's violations of international human rights norms. 49 Central to the
United States' "Iraq against the world"50 policy were the various
United Nations Security Council resolutions passed after Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait,5 1 one of which authorized the use of force against Iraq
after January 15, 1991.52
46. One poll estimated that 75% of the U.S. public supported President Bush's decision to
launch a ground war against Iraq. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at A17, col. 3 (reporting results
of a N.Y. Times/C.B.S. poll). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1991, at A9, col. 1. Opposition
groups were also vocal and analogized U.S. involvement in the Middle East to its prior
involvement in Vietnam. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1991, § 21, at 17, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Jan. 20, 1991, § 1, at 18A, col. 3.
47. For example, President Bush froze all Iraqi assets in the U.S. and banned all trade with
Iraq on August 2, 1990, in immediate response to the invasion. Exec. Order 12,722, 55 Fed.
Reg. 31,803 (1990). Bush also blocked access to all Iraqi property and interests in the U.S.
and prohibited the import into the U.S. of any goods or services of Iraqi origin; the export to
Iraq of any goods, technology or services (humanitarian articles excluded); all transactions for
transportation betweerr U.S. citizens and Iraq; the purchase of goods exported by Iraq to another
country; the performance of any contract in support of an industrial, commercial, or governmental
project in Iraq; the grant, extension of credits, or loans by any U.S. citizen to Iraq; and any
transaction by a U.S. citizen which avoided or intended to avoid any of the prohibitions set
forth above. Id. at 31,805. Furthermore, the State Department revoked all Iraqi licenses for
importing and exporting munitions to and from the U.S. 55 Fed. Reg. 31,808 (1990). The
Department of Transportation prohibited any aircraft carrying cargo other than medicines and
approved humanitarian food supplies to Iraq or Kuwait from invading U.S. air space. 14 C.F.R.
§ 91 (1990).
The United Nations imposed an economic embargo on Iraq and Kuwait and authorized the
U.S. and other naval powers to enforce the embargo. U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/670 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990) (available from the United Nations).
48. Hostilities broke our on January 16, 1991, and continued until President Bush ended
the military offensive February 28, 1991. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al, col. 2; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
49. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, § 4, at 1, col. 3; President's Remarks on Signing the
Human Rights Day, Bill of Rights Day, and Human Rights Week Proclamation, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 2015, 2016 (Dec. 10, 1990); December 14 Remarks, supra note 45;
President's Exchange with Reporters Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1907 (Nov. 22, 1990); November 1 News Conference, iupra note 45; Wash. Post, Jan.
11, 1991, at A21, col. 1.
50. President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 26 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc.
1304 (Aug. 30, 1990) [hereinafter August 30 News Conference]. The Bush Administration's
persistent lobbying convinced U.S. allies to support the U.N. Security Council resolutions
condemning Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and its treatment of third party citizens. President's
Remarks at a White House Briefing for Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1300 (Aug. 28, 1990) [hereinafter August 28 Remarks].
51. U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
(1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990); U.N. Doec. SRES/666
(1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990); U.N. Doec. S/RES/669 (1990); U.N. Doec. S/RES/670
(1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/677 (1990); U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990) (available from the United Nations).
52. See U.N. Doc. S/RES1678 (available from the United Nations).
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The Bush Administration's new emphasis on Iraqi human rights
abuses was supported by reports of severe abuses perpetrated by the
Iraqis against Kuwaiti citizens, refugees, and United States citizens.
Such human rights organizations as Amnesty International detailed
horrendous abuses against trapped Kuwaiti citizens, including extra-
judicial executions, 53 torture, 54 and the denial of foodstuffs, supplies,
and medical treatment. 55 Both the Bush Administration and Congress
vehemently condemned the much-publicized abuses of Kuwaiti citi-
zens who remained in Kuwait after the invasion.
56
The Bush Administration 57 and Congress5" also condemned Iraq for
the refugee crisis generated by the invasion. 59 Approximately one
53. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONA. USA, IRAQIOccuPIED KUWAIT: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA-
TIONS SINCE AUGUST 2, 1990 (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter AMNESTY REPORT] at 44-52. Iraqis
reportedly would take detainees to the detainees' homes for identification, shoot the detainees
in the backs of their heads in front of their families, and then ask the families to pay for the
bullets. Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., Subcomm. on Human Rights: Human Rights
Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., in Federal News Service, Jan. 9, 1991 (NEXIS)
[hereinafterJanuary 8 hearing]; see also NEWS FROM MIDDLE EAST WATCH, Nov. 16, 1990, at
6 [hereinafter MIDDLE EAST WATCH REPORT]. Reports from Kuwait revealed numerous accounts
of mass executions, torture, tape, beatings, looting and unlawful appropriations. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1990, at A13, col. 4. In the first two or three days after the invasion, Iraqis reportedly
killed at least 300 Kuwaitis. Id.
54. See AMNEFsrY REPORT, supra note 53, at 27-38. Iraq reportedly used 38 forms of torture
in Kuwait, including gouging of the eyes, extinguishing cigarettes on the eyeballs, and pouring
an acid-like substance onto the skin. January 8 hearing, supra note 53.
55. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 53, at 55-58; Kuwait: Human Rights Atrocities in
Kuwait: Hearing Before the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., in
Federal News Service, Oct. 10, 1990 (NEXIS) [hereinafter October 10 hearing]; MIDDLE EAST
WATCH REPORT, supra note 53, at 1-2. After Iraqi forces left Kuwait, Kuwaiti citizens allegedly
retaliated against Palestinians suspected of assisting Iraq. The U.S. did not intervene to prevent
the Kuwaitis from abusing these people. Boston Globe, Mar. 9, 1991, at 5, col. 1.
56. See, e.g., President's News Conference, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 1548, 1553-54
(Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter October 9 News Conference]; November 1 News Conference, supra
note 45. President Bush and Congress also stressed Amnesty International reports, particularly
the December report. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 53; see also President's Remarks at a
Republican Fund-Raising Reception in Omaha, Nebraska, 26 WEEKLY COmp. PRES. Doc.
1595, 1596 (Oct. 15, 1990);January 8 Hearing, supra note 53.
57. See, e.g., October 9 News Conference, supra note 56.
58. See, e.g., U.S. Refugee Programs in Kuwait and Elsewhere: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess., in Federal News Service, Oct. 3, 1990 (NEXIS) [hereinafter
Refugee Programs]. In response to the crisis, the U.S. provided $18 million for food and aid and
$10 million for transportation. The international community donated much more-$200-million
for supplies and services ranging from foodstuffs to aircraft and other forms of transportation.
Id.
59. Iraq's treatment of these refugees violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
and article 28 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Iraq ratified
this agreement in 1956. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1556 (Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, & B.
Zimmerman eds. 1987)). Iraq also violated U.N. Resolution 664 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990)
(available from the United Nations).
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million people became refugees, 60 including almost half the pre-in-
vasion population of Kuwait. 61 While the refugees who successfully
escaped Iraq and Kuwait found some relief in Turkey, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia,62 the refugees who remained within Iraq's control were
subject to deplorable conditions. 63 According to news reports, while
food supplies were sometimes available to those with money, they did
not reach the poorest refugees." Iraq exacerbated the refugee crisis by
taking food from displaced nationals, 6 5 closing its borders with neigh-
boring countries, 66 and refusing to allow relief agencies to enter the
militarized area. Moreover, Iraqi government officials made public
statements that undermined Iraq's claims of fair play.67
The United States was another target of Iraqi human rights abuses.
Following its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq held approximately 3000
United States citizens hostage. 6  Iraq threatened to use detained
United States nationals as "human shields" in the event of war,69 but
denied that these people were "hostages." 70 As early as August 19,
1990, Iraq conditioned a release of Western nationals on the repeal
of the embargo, repeal of United States and U.N. economic
sanctions, and removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia.7 1
President Bush dismissed the offer,7 2 although he repeatedly em-
60. MIDDLE EAsT WATCH REPORT, supra note 53, at 17. However, of the nearly one million
refugees to flee Iraq and Kuwait, most were not Kuwaitis but third-country nationals formerly
employed in Iraq and Kuwait. Refugee Programs, supra note 58.
61. MIDDLE EAST WATCH REPORT, supra note 53, at 17.
62. Refugee Programr, supra note 58.
63. See MIDDLE EAsT WATCH REPORT, supra note 53, at 1.
64. See Boston Globe, Sept. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
65. See MIDDLE EAST WATCH REPORT, supra note 53, at 11. Iraqi soldiers reportedly took
foodstuffs from Kuwait warehouses and closed Kuwait's shops, making food even more difficult
to find. Id.; L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at 9, col. 1.
66. See MIDDLE EAST WATCH REPORT, supra note 53, at 16. Although Iraq sporadically
opened its borders with neighboring countries following the invasion, Iraq barred war refugees
from leaving Iraq and Kuwait, blocking the major escape route for hundreds of thousands of
foreigners trapped behind the lines. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1991, at A1, col. 5.
67. British Broadcasting Corp., Oct. 5, 1990, at Al. Iraqi Trade Minister Muhammad
Mahdi Salih said, "[Ajsking the country exposed to an unfair economic embargo to secure food
supplies for foreigners lays bare an unjust and imperialist mentality. Those who adopted the
unfair economic boycott and embargo decision will bear the consequences." Id.
68. NEws FROM MIDDLE EAST WATCH, Aug. 29, 1990, at 7.
69. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1990, at A26, col. 2. By taking hostages, Iraq directly violated
article 6, § I and article 9, §§ 1-5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966). Iraq also
violated article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
70. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
71. Boston Globe, Aug. 20, 1990, at 1, col. 6.
72. Id. President Bush argued that bargaining for hostages would reward Saddam Hussein
for brutality. August 30 News Conference, supra note 48. Bush's refusal to bargain for hostages
continued President Reagan's policy against negotiating with terrorists. See President's Procla-
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phasized release of the hostages as a primary objective of military
involvement. 73
The United States, the United Nations and some Arab states re-
sponded to the Iraqi hostage crisis with sudden and dramatic condem-
nation. 74 Congress denounced the abusive hostage situation75 and Pres-
ident Bush used the hostage crisis to garner support for economic
sanctions and commitment of American troops to defend Saudi Arabia
and liberate Kuwait. 76 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein finally ordered
the hostages' release on December 6, 1990.
7 7
After the outbreak of hostilities on January 16, 1991 ,7 the United
States further suffered Iraqi human rights abuses with Iraq's reportedly
harsh treatment of Allied prisoners of war.7 9 Both the Bush Admin-
istration and Congress emphatically demanded that Iraq provide pro-
tection and fair treatment to Allied forces captured during the war.8 0
Specifically, the United States condemned Iraq's practice of parading
prisoners through the streets of Baghdad and Iraq's use of prisoners as
human shields against future Allied missile attacks and bombing
raids.8 1 Iraq may also have drugged or tortured the POWs to coerce
political statements denouncing the Allied war effort.8 2 In response,
the Bush Administration, Congress, and Allied governments voiced
interest in prosecuting Saddam Hussein for war crimes.8 3
mation 5557-A Time of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism, 1986 PuB. P"pERS 1416
(Oct. 22, 1986).
73. See, e.g., August 28 Remarks, supra note 53; President's Exchange with Reporters Aboard
Air Force One, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1272 (Aug. 20, 1990); Statement by Press
Secretary Fitawater on the Treatment of Foreign Nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1265 (Aug. 18, 1990).
74. President Bush exercised the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1990)), the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1990), and 3 U.S.C. § 301
(1990), to issue two Executive Orders to sanction Iraq. See Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed.
Reg. 31,803 (1990); Exec. Order 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (1990). The United Nations
passed several resolutions voicing concern for the hostages. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/RESI664
(1990) (available from the United Nations). Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
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See Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A13, col. 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1990, at AS, col. 1.
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77. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
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79. See Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1991, at Al, col. 1;.L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1991, at Al, col.
5; Boston Globe, Jan. 22, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
80. Congress passed a non-binding resolution condemning Iraq for violating the Geneva
Convention. S. Con. Res. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S1107 (daily ed. Jan.
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82. See Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
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Iraq's treatment of the Kuwaitis, the refugees, the hostages, and
the POWs reflects its continuing disregard for the basic human rights
not only of its own citizens but of foreign nationals as well. Reports
suggest, however, that Iraqi human rights abuses were as severe
throughout the decade before the invasion84 as they proved to be in
August, 1990.85 Widespread torture, extrajudicial arrests, summary
executions, and the 1988 chemical weapons attack against the Kurds
placed Iraq amongst the world's worst human rights offenders8 6 well
before its invasion of Kuwait.
Human rights nevertheless did not become part of United States
foreign policy rhetoric until after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,8 7 when
President Bush used reports of abuses to garner national and interna-
tional support for a military response against Iraq. If such abuses had
sincerely motivated the Reagan and Bush Administrations, either
Administration would have condemned them well before August 1990
by cooperating with Congress to impose economic sanctions,88 by
attempting to orchestrate international denunciation of Iraq, or at least
by refraining from providing Iraq with economic,8 9 military, 90 and
political9 1 support. Specifically, the Reagan and Bush Administrations
could have eliminated or reduced substantial United States agricultural
subsidies to Iraq. 92 The failure of the Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions to consider human rights abuses in formulating their foreign
policy toward Iraq throughout the 1980s suggests either that human
rights concerns suddenly became a priority after August 2, 1990, or
that they were manipulated to achieve political objectives.
The Reagan and Bush Administrations probably chose not to focus
on Iraq's human rights abuses before August 2 in order to preserve
good relations with Iraq, which they deemed a critical United States
foreign policy, objective in the region. After the Organization of
initiatives to indict Saddam Hussein for war crimes. See S.C. Res. 4, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REC. S1107 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991).
84. See rupra note 4.
85. A major additional human rights violation was, of course, denial of self-determination
to Kuwaiti citizens. Self-determination is guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 1(1), U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, art. 1 (1), U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967).
86. Korn, supra note 4, at 14.
87. The only possible exception to the Reagan Administration's conciliatory attitude toward
Iraq was its concern with the proliferation of chemical weapons after Iraq used such weapons
during the Iran-Iraq War. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 15, 18, 27-29, 32, 33 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 10, 13 and accompanying text.
91. Seesupra notes 9, 11, 12 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text.
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Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") dramatically raised oil prices
in the late 1970s, 93 the Reagan Administration attempted to develop
stronger ties with oil-producing countries, such as Iraq, to ensure a
steady supply of oil to the United States and its allies. 94 Moreover,
United States-Iranian relations drastically deteriorated as a result of
the Iranian hostage crisis and Iran's exportation of anti-American
Islamic fundamentalism. 95 After losing Iran as an ally following the
Iranian Revolution, 96 the United States hoped to gain a new foothold
in the Persian Gulf region. 97 Given Iraq's increased strategic impor-
tance, the United States may have been willing to overlook Iraq's
human rights record in order to achieve other important foreign policy
objectives.
The Bush Administration's actions following the invasion of Kuwait
indicate that its foreign policy toward Iraq continues to be shaped by
geopolitical rather than human rights concerns. At the same time as
the Bush Administration was citing human rights as a justification
for military action, it was allying itself with countries themselves
known for serious human rights violations. Among coalition partners
with the most deficient human rights records were Afghanistan, Bang-
ladesh, Honduras, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Turkey. 98 Furthermore, several coalition members appear to have
pledged their support for the United States' position in return for
military and economic assistance. 99 As a result, the United States
effort in the Gulf actually may cause a deterioration of human rights
protection in some of these countries because United States assistance
may help sustain repressive governments.
United States pre-war policy toward Iraq exposes the hollow and
hypocrytical nature of its human rights policy. The Reagan and Bush
Administrations used human rights ultimately to serve higher priority
strategic interests. Although the inconsistency in United States human
93. See generally R. LANDIS & N. KLASS, OPEC: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES (1980).
94. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. U.S. concern for the oil supply was most evident
in its actions to protect Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War. See N.Y. Times, June 12,
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88).
95. See generally A. NORMAN, THE BITTLE MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL EVALUATION OF IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1979-1980
(1981); Rubin, Middle East: Search For Peace, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 583 (1985/86).
96. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at A9, col. 3.
97. The U.S. may have hoped to balance Soviet influence on Iraq. See N.Y. Times, May 29,
1982, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
98. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1990, at 1360-67, 1387-1400, 665-76, 1547-59, 273-82, 1586-1607, 1615-28, 1646-
57, 1286-1303 (respectively) (1991).
99. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,358 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (regarding forgiveness of Egypt's
debt); Haberman, On Iraq's Other Front, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 18, 1990, at 44, 46.
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rights policy toward Iraq did not hinder the Bush Administration's
ability to garner support for the Gulf War, it seriously undermines
United States credibility within the international human rights arena
and can only weaken future efforts to bring regimes like that of Saddam
Hussein into compliance with international human rights norms.
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